European Exceptionalism in International Law by Lickova, Magdalena
The European Journal of International Law Vol. 19 no. 3 © EJIL 2008; all rights reserved
..........................................................................................
EJIL (2008), Vol. 19 No. 3, 463–490 doi: 10.1093/ejil/chn028
 European Exceptionalism in 
International Law 
 Magdalena  Li č ková *  
 Abstract 
 For Member States of the European Union, participation in this supranational organization 
has increased the number of difﬁ culties in the international arena. Occasionally, the expand-
ing legislative activity of the European institutions reaches out beyond the borders of the 
European legal system and incidentally affects the EU Member States ’ autonomous rela-
tions with third parties. Consequently the EU and its members, often with success, seek third 
parties ’ consent to exceptional treatment. Because of their number and signiﬁ cance, such 
derogations have inspired this article to inquire into their expansion and legal status under 
international law. Even though the EU-related exceptions have not created an international 
customary rule, the article observes that European integration shapes international rules in 
diverse ﬁ elds and adjusts them to its needs. Since European integration is designed to admin-
ister and regulate an increasing number of issues, the autonomous international obligations 
of the EU Member States may become an obstacle. Because the European Union is likely to 
continue using special treatment in the future, it is important to assess how far the suprana-
tional exception can go in order to accommodate all interests at stake. 
 1   Introduction 
 In the family of international organizations, the European Union (EU) 1 stands apart. 
Carrying out a project of economic and political integration, this supranational entity 
escapes the traditional categories of constitutional and international law. 
 *  LL.M. 2007, Harvard Law School, PhD candidate at Université Paris I – Sorbonne, France, and the Un -
iversity of West Bohemia in Plze ň , Czech Republic. I would like to express my warm gratitude to Professor 
Jack L. Goldsmith, who supervised, commented on, and criticized my LL.M. paper that gave birth to the 
present work. I am very thankful also to Jane Bestor, Frank Hoffmeister, Pieter Jan Kuijper, Esa Paasivirta, 
and Francesca Strumia for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. All errors remain exclusively mine. 
Email:  Magdalena.Lickova@post.harvard.edu. 
 1  In this article, I will often refer to the EU as covering also the EC structure or to the EU/EC in aggregate, if 
appropriate, because in the ﬁ eld of foreign affairs, the legal basis for European action sometimes consists 
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 The EU members have endowed the supranational institutions with many domestic 
and external powers. In recent years, the exercise of these powers has given rise to 
intricate international situations. Unlike the EU itself, the EU Member States are and 
remain sovereign entities. This means that even in ﬁ elds where competences have 
been transferred from the national to the supranational level, these states may be 
held internationally liable if the execution of a European rule infringes upon their pre-
existing obligations toward foreign states and international organizations. Yet, the 
emergence of such conﬂ icts does not absolve the same states from their obligations 
under EU law. 
 However novel this issue may seem, it mirrors traditional experiences recorded by 
federal states. Federations, whose constitutions reserve large areas of autonomy to 
sub-federal entities, observe that sub-federal actions may provoke international con-
sequences that potentially affect the whole nation. The absence of international legal 
personality, nonetheless, keeps the sub-federal entities safe from direct international 
reactions. In contrast, the international sovereignty of the EU Member States may 
expose the latter to international liability for wrongful acts done by the supranational 
institutions. 
 The EU members have been challenged on this account mainly before the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the judicial organs of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). A potential risk also lurks behind the intensive implementation by 
the European institutions of the obligations arising under the United Nations (UN) 
Charter. 2 In these and other instances the European states meet difﬁ culties that have 
much in common with the situation that federal governments traditionally encoun-
ter. In both cases the governments in question face international effects provoked by 
an entity the international legal capacity of which to act is paradoxically missing or 
incomplete. 
 The complexity of the EU legislation that incidentally generates international 
consequences makes the international situation of the Member States more difﬁ cult 
every day. For this reason, the EU and its members have introduced legal tools that, 
if consented to by third parties, endow the international obligations of the EU states 
with ﬂ exibility. It seems that third parties have indeed paid attention to the peculiar 
nature of the EU legal order and to the speciﬁ c legal position in which the EU states 
often operate. A generalized understanding has emerged that whenever an EU Mem-
ber State comes to the international-negotiation table, the European-law implications 
will be part of the agenda. Accordingly, third parties adjust to this state of affairs, and 
the question today is whether this EU-friendly treatment has reached the status of an 
international custom. 
of a complex combination of acts issued in both, EC and EU framework. If appropriate, I will distinguish 
between the two. The supranational qualiﬁ cation is linked obviously only to the EC, whereas the EU is 
governed by the inter-governmental method of decision-making. 
 2  Charter of the UN, signed on 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 993 UNTS 
1153. 
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 Only a tiny number of scholarly writings have examined the issue from both European 
and international sides. 3 Rather, these two aspects have been dealt with separately. 
Such partial inquiries are useful, but they remain incomplete because both legal orders 
intervene and interplay when normative conﬂ icts between them appear. The purpose 
of this article is thus to merge both perspectives into a comprehensive analysis of the 
challenge that the EU members face in this context and of the correlative transformation 
that international practice undergoes in consequence. The article proceeds as follows. 
 The ﬁ rst part lays out the problem of the EU states ’ international autonomy in the 
context of European integration. Here, I will brieﬂ y discuss the American federal expe-
rience of foreign relations, which mirrors the current interrogations in Europe. I then 
describe the legal framework of the European law of external relations. Afterwards, 
I expose the conﬂ icts in the EU states ’ obligations and the solutions offered respec-
tively in European and international law. Because neither of these solutions provides 
satisfactory answers, the second part of this article analyses new developments that 
European diplomacy is bringing into international practice, either to heal existing 
conﬂ icts or to prevent them. In this part I ﬁ rst consider the well-established experi-
ence of the European states under the GATT and the WTO. Subsequently, I examine 
recent puzzles that have surfaced before the ECtHR and regarding the UN Charter. 
Even though the European strategy calls for a value judgement, this article does not 
imply, by the choice of its title, an  a priori opinion. The term  ‘ exceptionalism ’ merely 
refers to the factual state of affairs in which the EU members ask for and receive a 
growing number of EU-friendly exceptions from their international partners. 
 2   European Integration and the International Autonomy of 
EU Member States 
 Every political entity, whether a sovereign state or a supranational organization, allo-
cates the responsibilities to different political levels with respect to international powers. 
Nations organized under a federal form of government generally assign the conduct of 
foreign relations to the federal government. 4 If self-executing, international rights and 
obligations that result from the exercise of this power have domestic legal effects and 
trump conﬂ icting state law. Even though the constitutional rules do not always pre-
vent the undesirable involvement of sub-federal constituencies in federal foreign policy, 
national enforcement mechanisms usually restore the unity of action. 5 
 3  Hoffmeister ,  ‘ Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirket v. Ireland. App. No. 45036/98 ’ , 100 
 AJIL  (2006) 442; Kuijper and Paasivirta,  ‘ Further Exploring International Responsibility: the European 
Community and the ILC’s Project on Responsibility of International Organisations ’ , 1  Int’l Orgs L Rev 
(2004) 111. 
 4  See Art. VI of the US Constitution or Arts 25 and 32(1) of the German Basic Law. Note, however, Art. 
32(3):  ‘ [i]nsofar as the Länder have power to legislate, they may, with the consent of the Federal Govern-
ment, conclude treaties with foreign states ’ . ( ‘ Soweit die Länder für die Gesetzgebung zuständig sind, 
können sie mit Zustimmung der Bundesregierung mit auswärtigen Staaten Verträge abschließen ’ .) 
 5  To recall a major example, the Massachusetts Burma legislation provoked an action within the WTO that 
the whole US federation had to face. See the complaint by the EC WT/DS88, denouncing the violation 
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 In the last few decades, the European Union has been granted an unprecedented 
number of external powers which has engendered the need to circumscribe the corre-
sponding competences of the EU members. Unlike a federal government the suprana-
tional institutions are not endowed with sovereignty because the latter remains with the 
constituent states only. Accordingly, the EU states may pursue autonomous external 
policies but also be penalized if their conduct infringes EU law. This situation is simi-
lar to the legal consequences that a sub-federal entity faces if its action unduly affects 
national foreign relations. There is, however, one major difference. Because sub-federal 
units do not generally have international legal personality, they cannot validly establish 
legal relations with foreign nations, including legal relations arising out of liability. 6 For 
the purpose of international responsibility, a state action that impinges on national for-
eign engagements will be ascribed to the federal government. 7 The latter must then ﬁ nd 
means to accommodate national foreign commitments and call the recalcitrant state to 
order without, however, infringing principles of vertical federalism. 
 Today, the federal experience is, in this respect, mirrored in European practice. After 
50 years of existence, the EU has engendered a dense legal order. On occasion, its leg-
islative activity reaches beyond the EU’s legal space and incidentally affects relations 
between third parties and EU members. The latter can be held internationally liable 
 vis-à-vis third parties for conduct arising out of the implementation of EU law. Like 
the federal government, the respective EU states must then confront the international 
consequences of behaviour that is not their own. 
 A   The EU Member States and the International Consequences of 
European Integration 
 Launched in 1957, the process of European integration has today engendered a 
unique entity. Usually qualiﬁ ed as an international organization  sui generis , the 
European Community (EC) has created a speciﬁ c legal order engaging supranational 
by the US of the General Procurement Agreement, which is one of the instruments administered by the 
WTO. The EC ﬁ led an ofﬁ cial request for consultation on 20 June 1997 with respect to the Act regulating 
State Contracts with companies doing Business with Burma (Myanmar), enacted by the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts on 25 June 1996. The panel proceedings were suspended at the request of the complain-
ants, on 10 Feb. 1999, and have not been resumed since. More recently, comments have been triggered 
by a decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which refused to obey a presidential memorandum 
requesting state courts to comply with a decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the  Avena 
case ( Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. US ) [2004] ICJ Rep 128, at 12),  Ex parte José Ernesto 
Medellín , Tex Crim App, 15 Nov. 2006, No. AP-75207. 
 6  In 1942 the US Supreme Court could announce that  ‘ in respect of [the US] foreign relations generally, 
state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State[s  … do] not exist ’ :  US v. Pink, 315 US 203 (1942), at 
331. 
 7  See Art. 4 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Interna-
tional Law Commission, 2001, available at:  http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf . See also UN GA res. 59/35 of 2 Dec. 2004. For judicial decisions con-
ﬁ rming the rule see quotations by the International Law Commission in the Draft Arts with commentar-
ies, at 84 – 92, reproduced in Ofﬁ cial Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement 
No. 10 (A/56/10) and in the annex to UN GA res. 56/83 of 12 Dec. 2001. 
 European Exceptionalism in International Law      467 
institutions, member states, and the citizens thereof. Its origins are rooted in the 
Treaty of Rome 8 and therefore remain international. The secondary law derived 
from the Treaty of Rome has, however, been shaped pursuant to methods of inte-
gration and qualiﬁ es as supranational. This means that the European decisions are 
generally taken not by a unanimous vote, but by simple or qualiﬁ ed majority. The 
supranational nature of the EC legal order is also associated with its direct effect, 
primacy over the norms of different states, effect of pre-emption, and efﬁ cient 
mechanisms of enforcement. 9 
 In the last three decades the supranational endeavour has acquired a large inter-
national dimension. The EC has concluded or adhered to many international trea-
ties and has become a major actor in a number of international institutions. The 
textual foundations of the European law of external relations are, nevertheless, frag-
mentary. Article 281 of the EC Treaty 10 establishes the international personality of 
the European Community, 11 but the provision itself does not reveal anything about 
the circumstances under which it can be exercised. Unlike sovereign states and like 
every international organization, the EU must comply with the principle of enumer-
ated powers, i.e., it can act only when duly authorized and only to the authorized 
extent. 12 
 It is not easy to present the legal framework of European external relations because 
it is built upon elements whose shape changes over time. First, the existence of an 
EC/EU international power is rarely explicitly anchored, and most of the time its rec-
ognition emerges progressively. Secondly, once it is identiﬁ ed, the task of determining 
whether this competence is exclusively supranational or whether it is shared with 
Member States is equally intricate. Even when both points are clariﬁ ed, the assessment 
can never be deﬁ nitive because the supranational competences may vary over time. 
These uncertainties affect Member States as well as third parties. Every supranational 
 8  Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed on 25 Mar. 1957 which entered into 
force on 1 Jan. 1958, 298 UNTS 11. See also the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union 
and of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ (2006) C 321/1. 
 9  See De Witte,  ‘ Retour à Costa. La primauté du droit communautaire à la lumière du droit international ’ , 
20  Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (1984) 425. 
 10  Supra note 8. 
 11  The legal personality is understood as an agglomerate of capacities to enter into binding agreements, 
to implement international obligations, and to carry out activities relating to right to receive and send 
diplomatic delegations (passive and active legation). The EC has been entitled to act with respect to all 
these powers. Their exercise is, however, constrained by the limited functions that the EC is permitted to 
carry out. In practice, the delimitation of external competences is rather a matter of degree than one of 
clear-cut solutions. It also depends on international rules that the EC is willing to subscribe to because 
some international conventions do not allow for the participation of the international organizations. 
 12  See Art. 5(1) EC. See generally  F. Hoffmeister,  The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law (forth-
coming). See also  D.R. Verwey ,  The European Community, the European Union and the International Law of 
Treaties. A Comparative Legal Analysis of the Community and Union’s External Treaty-Making Practice (2004). 
For the EU external relations legal framework as conceived in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe see B. Martenczuk,  ‘ The Constitution for Europe and the External Relations of the European Un-
ion ’ , in S. van Thiel, K. de Gucht, and R. Lewis (eds),  Understanding the New European Constitutional Treaty, 
Why a NO Vote Means Less Democracy, Human Rights and Security (2005), at 253. 
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competence implies important constraints upon the Member States 13 that can be sub-
ject to EU sanctions if their international behaviour violates powers already allocated 
under the supranational authority. The boundaries are relatively clear with respect to 
the traditional provinces of the EC, such as external trade anchored in Article 131 EC. 
In contrast, the Member States have to be vigilant in areas where the EC’s competence 
is just beginning to develop and rather vague. In such cases, the correlative interna-
tional obligations of the Member States may be unclear. 
 Third states may be confused as to whether the EU or the Member States are com-
petent to deal with them with respect to a particular subject. The respective powers of 
the EU and of the Member States are by deﬁ nition entangled, and whenever the former 
expands the latter become smaller. But whether the division of powers within the EU 
will be taken into consideration internationally depends entirely on the agreement of 
third parties. In recent international practice the question is sometimes addressed by 
declarations of competences that the EC and EC members have to provide and update 
in order to be allowed to participate in some international agreements. 14 
 In many areas the European institutions have been able to take over the conduct 
of external relations previously managed by the Member States. In many other areas 
this ability still does not exist. Because the autonomous international acts of the states 
may hamper supranational policies, the EC legal order has developed efﬁ cient mecha-
nisms of prevention and sanction. If the need exists, the Member States are required 
to renegotiate and even to terminate undesirable international agreements. However, 
the third parties may not necessarily agree to this adjustment and insist on keeping 
the agreement in force. In situations where no legal link exists between a third party 
and the EU, the Member States may be held internationally liable for conduct arising 
out of the implementation of an EU rule incompatible with their international duties. 
These states may thus face the impossible task of complying with mutually exclusive 
obligations. 
 This situation is not without solutions. The EU legal system provides one, and so 
does the general international law of treaties. On occasion, a speciﬁ c treaty may estab-
lish its own conﬂ ict-of-laws regime. Both schemes, nonetheless, have a major ﬂ aw. 
Their validity is by deﬁ nition conﬁ ned to the boundaries of the legal order that has 
engendered them, whether European or international. The next section assesses these 
solutions and identiﬁ es their limits. 
 13  For a recent manifestation of an international action by the EU Member States, prohibited under EC law, 
see the set of three decisions in the MOX Plant case: International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea  The 
MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. UK), Request for provisional measures, 3 Dec. 2001, Case No. 10, 41 ILM 
(2002) 405; The Permanent Court of Arbitration,  The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. UK) , order No. 3, Sus-
pension of proceedings on jurisdiction and merits and request for further provisional measures, 24 June 
2003, 42 ILM (2003) 1187; Case C – 459/03,  Commission v. Ireland [2006] ECR I – 4635. 
 14  The multilateral treaties that under EC law qualify as mixed often contain provisions requiring the Mem-
ber States and the EC to communicate and periodically update a list specifying the intra-European divi-
sion of powers with respect to the given treaty. Powers not listed as supranational are automatically 
presumed to fall within the authority and under the international responsibility of the Member States: 
see Annex IX of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 10 Dec. 1982, which entered into 
force on 16 Nov. 1996, 1833 UNTS 31363; 21 ILM (1982) 1261. 
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 B   Normative Conﬂ icts between International and Supranational 
Obligations of the EU Member States: Two Legal Systems at Odds 
 By deﬁ nition, normative conﬂ icts arising from the obligations of the EU states call into 
question two different legal orders, European and international. It is relatively easy 
to identify solutions foreseen for normative conﬂ icts within each of them separately. 
However, every normative system tends to favour its own legal rules over norms com-
ing from an external normative order. Consequently, the resolution of the conﬂ icts 
often favours the legal system of the forum. The European system will typically require 
the Member States to give priority to their European commitment before any interna-
tional one. Conversely, a number of international agreements oblige the same states 
to disregard any conﬂ icting duties, including EU obligations. The two following sub-
sections show how the two legal orders generally react in situations of conﬂ ict. 
 1   Solutions in International Law: Inadequacy of Traditional Answers 
 Any obligation arising under EC law is a treaty-based obligation. Yet, some elements 
of EC practice are puzzling. Compared with the majority of treaty conﬂ icts, inconsist-
encies involving the EC treaty 15 defy the traditional legal framework. The density of 
the EC legal order, the political interdependence of current members, and the immedi-
acy of EU enforcement mechanisms encourage the EU Member States to honour their 
EU duties ﬁ rst. 
 When the European Court of Justice (ECJ) announced the  sui generis nature of the 
supranational legal order, it contrasted it with  ‘ ordinary international treaties ’ 16 and 
qualiﬁ ed it as a  ‘ new legal order of international law ’ 17 and as a legal order on its 
own. 18 Nevertheless, the Treaty of Rome was concluded in the form of an interna-
tional treaty, and the methods of its amendment remain those applicable to  ‘ ordinary ’ 
international agreements. Accordingly, normative conﬂ icts arising between the EC 
and other international conventions are a law-of-treaties problem. 
 The peculiarity of treaty conﬂ icts consists in their deﬁ nitional relativism. Each 
treaty may lay down its own conﬂ icts-of-laws rules. If the agreement contains no pro-
visions of this kind, the general interpretive rules of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) apply. 19 
 15  Supra note 8. 
 16  Case 6/64,  Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR1141:  ‘ [b]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC 
Treaty has created its own legal system which,  … , became an integral part of the legal systems of the 
Member States and which their courts are bound to apply ’ . In the French version, it is  ‘ ordre juridique 
propre intégré au système juridique des Etats membres ’ . 
 17  Case 26/62,  Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie des Belastingen [1963] ECR 3:  ‘ [t]he European 
Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for beneﬁ t of which the states 
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited ﬁ elds, and the subject of which comprise not only 
the Member States but also their nationals ’ . 
 18  Case 6/64,  supra note 16. 
 19  The Vienna Convention was adopted on 22 May 1969, and entered into force on 27 Jan. 1980, 1155 
UNTS 331. To date the Vienna Convention has 45 signatories and 108 parties. The majority of the EU 
states have ratiﬁ ed with the exception of France, Malta, and Romania. See generally P. Reuter ,  La Conven-
tion de Vienne sur le Droit des traités  ( 1970), at 61. 
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 Conﬂ icts in treaty obligations may appear in different constellations, depending on 
the identity of the subject matter and of the parties, as well as on the chronology of 
their adoption. Accordingly, interpretation under general international law operates 
with basic rules such as  lex specialis and  lex posterior . 20 Since these apply only to con-
ﬂ icts of treaties with identical parties, they do not provide much help for our problem. 
Article 30(4) of the VCLT, 21 dealing with  ‘ application of successive treaties relating to 
the same subject matter ’ and involving different parties, provides: 
 When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one: 
 (a) as between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3 [the ear-
lier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later 
treaty]; 
 (b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the 
treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations. 
By virtue of paragraph (4)(b) of Article 30, treaty conﬂ icts are resolved in a way 
that favours the preservation of the validity of incompatible instruments. The par-
ties engaged simultaneously by two or more agreements are invited simply to choose 
which duty they will honour and which they will violate by virtue of this choice. 
Embracing the principle of relative effects of treaties, the provision shifts the prob-
lem away from the issue of the validity of the conﬂ icting treaties to the international 
responsibility that violation of one of the treaties will most likely trigger. 
 Analogous reasoning applies to VCLT Article 27, which is another major rule in 
this context and a mirror image of the relative-effects-of-treaties principle. Article 27 
codiﬁ es the international customary rule prohibiting states from referring to their 
domestic law in order to justify a violation of an international obligation. 22 For the 
purpose of this article, the latter provision has signiﬁ cance in so far as the EC legal 
order may be compared, in light of its speciﬁ c features, to a domestic one. It is difﬁ cult 
to argue that by its legal form the EC Treaty is different from an international treaty. 
However, the highly integrated nature of EC secondary law and the above-mentioned 
dicta of the ECJ inspire views that the international implications of the Member States ’ 
duties under EU law should be considered in light of VCLT Article 27 rather than Arti-
cle 30. The assimilation of law produced by international organizations to a domestic 
 20  See Art. 30 VCLT,  supra note 19. 
 21  I. Sinclair ,  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd rev. and enlarged edn, 1984). For the ap-
plication of the Vienna Convention in the EC see Kuijper,  ‘ The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ’ , 25  Legal Issues of European Integration (1998) 1. See Report 
of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, ﬁ nalized by  M. Koskenniemi,  Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difﬁ culties Arising from the Diversiﬁ cation and Expansion of International Law , doc. A/
CN.4/L.682, at 17 – 18, paras 21 – 22, at 129 ff , para. 253 ff. 
 22  ‘ A party may not invoke provisions of its internal law as justiﬁ cation for its failure to perform a treaty ’ . 
The rule of Art. 27 is mirrored in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and In-
ternational Organizations or between International Organizations, which has not yet entered into force, 
adopted on 21 Mar. 1986, doc. A/CONF.129/15. Neither the EU nor the EC has signed it and a minority 
of the EU states have signed or ratiﬁ ed. 
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legal order was discussed in the 1980s, during the conference leading to the adop-
tion of the Convention on the Law of the Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations. The participating delegations 
addressed this question, but it is still open today. 23 Whatever the case, both articles 
embody the principle of  pacta sunt servanda . 24 In both cases the rule of international 
non-opposability of rules to parties who have not consented to them applies. 25 
 The Vienna Convention is not the only place where rules on treaty conﬂ icts can 
be found. To a considerable extent these are default rules, because very often trea-
ties provide their own mechanisms for resolving normative conﬂ icts. These particu-
lar mechanisms mainly include different types of conﬂ ict clauses, 26 which typically 
preserve the applicability of previous or subsequent same-subject-matter treaties or 
which lay down the hierarchical primacy of a given treaty. 27 The architects of Euro-
pean integration anticipated the risk of normative conﬂ icts, and included in the EC’s 
founding document a clause of the latter kind. 
 2   Solutions in EC Law: Limits of Domestic Answers 
 The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (the EEC, later the 
European Community) entered into force on 1 January 1958. International law required 
that in concluding the Treaty of Rome the participating states did not violate pre-exist-
ing commitments. This was a real challenge, given that the EEC’s ﬁ rst objective was to 
set up a customs union and that the six original members were among the signatories 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 28 The GATT is animated by the 
most-favoured-nation principle, which prohibits all forms of discriminatory treatment. 
 23  Morgenstern,  ‘ The Convention on the Law of the Treaties between States and International Organiza-
tions or between International Organizations ’ , in Y. Dinstein  International Law at a Time of Perplexity, 
Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne Martinus (1988), at 439. For a summary of discussion see UN Confer-
ence on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations, Vienna, 18 Feb. – 21 Mar. 1986, Ofﬁ cial Records, Vol. I, Summary records of the plenary 
meetings and of the Committee of the Whole, UN, New York, 1995, A/CONF.129/16, Vol. I. 
 24  Codiﬁ ed in Art. 26 VCLT. The customary nature of the  pacta sunt servanda rule was afﬁ rmed by the ICJ in 
the  Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK v. Iceland) , Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment [1973] ICJ Rep 3, at 18. 
See also the case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in  SS Wimbledon (France v. 
Germany) , 17 Aug. 1923, PCIJ, ser. A, No. 1, at 29 – 30;  Case concerning certain German interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland) (merits), 25 May 1926, PCIJ, ser. A, No. 7, at 19;  Treatment of Polish 
nationals and other persons of Polish origin or speech in the Dantzig territory , 4 Feb. 1932, advisory opinion, 
PCIJ, ser. A/B, No. 44, at 24. See also Case C – 286/90,  Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation 
Corp. [1992] ECR I – 6019, at 6052, para. 9. 
 25  See Annex IX to UNCLOS,  supra note 14. 
 26  See Koskenniemi,  supra note 21, at 17 – 18, paras 21 – 22 and 129 ff, para. 253 ff. 
 27  See, e.g., Art. 103 of the UN Charter,  supra note 2:  ‘ [i]n the event of a conﬂ ict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other inter-
national agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail ’ . The provision is referred 
to in Art. 30(1) VCLT,  supra note 19:  ‘ [s]ubject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
rights and obligations of States Parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter shall be 
determined in accordance with the following paragraphs ’ . See also Art. 20 of the Covenant of the League 
of the Nations (Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919) and Arts 103 and 104 of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 8,11,14, and 17 Dec. 1992, 32 ILM (1993) 289. 
 28  55 UNTS 194, TIAS 1700. In many aspects, the Treaty of Rome took inspiration from the GATT. 
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The ﬁ rst goal that the European endeavour sought to achieve was the establishment of a 
customs union, that is to say, a regionally integrated economic entity the external effect 
of which could only be discriminatory. The resulting antinomy was ﬁ nally resolved 
partly by the text of the GATT itself and partly by the GATT signatories, who consented, 
not without resistance, to the  statu quo . 29 This example shows that the risk of normative 
conﬂ icts has been evident since the beginning of European integration. The Treaty of 
Rome itself foresaw the need for a provision addressing inconsistencies arising out of the 
Member States ’ pre-existing international engagements. Its Article 307(1) (then Article 
234(1)) reads as follows: 
 The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for 
acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States on the 
one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions 
of this Treaty. 30 
 This  prima facie ﬂ exibility of Article 307 toward potentially conﬂ icting pre-existing 
engagements is to a great extent undercut in the following paragraph of the provi-
sion, which states: 
 To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member State or 
States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. 
Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropri-
ate, adopt a common attitude. 31 
 This provision gave the Member States a certain diplomatic leeway to comply with 
their pre-existing international engagements, but it simultaneously implied that 
these states would proceed to renegotiation. The standing European case law seems 
to construct this obligation as one of the results. The ECJ has indeed made it clear 
that if the renegotiation efforts fail, the Member States must denounce the instrument. 
The margin of action left to the states is thus very narrow. 32 If the normative conﬂ ict 
 29  O. Blin , La Communauté européenne, le GATT, l’Organisation mondiale du commerce. Contribution à l ’ étude des 
rapports institutionnels entre la Communauté européenne et les organisations internationales , PhD thesis, Uni-
versity of Toulouse (1997);  M. Li č ková,  La Communauté européenne et le système GATT/OMC. Perspectives 
croisées (2005). 
 30  On Art. 307 see Klabbers ,  ‘ Moribund on the Fourth July The Court of Justice on Prior Agreements of the 
Member States ’ , 26  ELRev (2001) 187; Cohen-Jonathan ,  ‘ Article 234 ’ , in V. Constantinesco, R. Kovar, 
J.-P. Jacqué and D. Simon (eds),  Traité instituant la CEE, Commentaire article par article (1992), at 1497, 
1501. 
 31  Art. 307(3) reads as follows:  ‘ [i]n applying the agreements referred to in the ﬁ rst paragraph, member 
states shall take into account the fact that the advantages accorded under this Treaty by each member 
state form an integral part of the establishment of the Community and are thereby inseparably linked 
with the creation of common institutions, the conferring of powers upon them and the granting of the 
same advantages by all the other member states ’ . 
 32  See, e.g., Case 10/61,  Commission v. Italian Republic [1962] ECR 1; Case 812/79,  Attorney General v. Juan 
C. Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787; Case C – 158/91,  Ministère public and Direction du travail et de l’emploi v. Jean-
Claude Levy [1993] ECR I – 4287; Case T – 315/01,  Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II – 3649; 
 C ase T – 306/01,  Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR 
II – 3533; Case T – 70/89,  British Broadcasting Corporation and BBC Enterprises Ltd v. Commission [1991] 
ECR II – 535; Case 76/89,  Independent Television Publications Ltd v. Commission [1991] ECR II – 575; Case 
69/89,  Radio Teleﬁ s Eireann v. Commission [1991] ECR II – 485; Cases 241/ 91 P and 242/91 P,  Radio 
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results from a treaty to which a Member State subscribed after the creation of or after 
its accession to the EU, the protection of Article 307 does not apply and the standard 
responsibility regime for violating EU law comes into play. 33 
 Accession treaties, which are a part of EC primary law, contain provisions that 
specify the scope of Article 307 with regard to the particular circumstances of the EU 
enlargements. Until the 1995 enlargement, the relevant accession instruments oper-
ated simply as practical arrangements relating to international affairs. The ﬁ rst ﬁ ve 
accessions required that the newcomers adhere to a certain number of international 
agreements. 34 But the scope of international-related adhesion prerequisites has radi-
cally changed since the  ‘ big ’ 2004 accession. 35 In comparison to the previous situa-
tion, the enlargement documents have embraced a rather restrictive policy. This shift 
can presumably be explained by the unprecedented size of the 2004 enlargement and 
by underlying concerns about the manageability of future conﬂ icts if these were not 
resolved upon accession. Hence, the restrictive rule of Article 307 has been further 
tightened in the following way. 36 
 In addition to the previous active obligation to accede to speciﬁ ed international 
instruments, the enlargement documents have added a negatively worded duty to 
renegotiate or denounce international engagements not compatible with EC law. 37 
Upon their accession, the new states were supposed to have brought their interna-
tional portfolios into complete harmony with EC requirements. Treaty renegotiation 
necessarily involves third countries ’ interest and consent and their inclination to con-
sider the speciﬁ c accession situation of the 10 states varied. This exercise proved to be 
a real challenge, but the European Commission helped to bring the vast majority of 
relevant agreements into line. 
Teleﬁ s Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v. Commission [1995] ECR I – 743; 
Joined Cases C – 364/95 and 365/95,  T. Port GmbH & Co v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg Jonas [1998] ECR I –
 1023; Case C – 377/98,  Netherlands v. Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I – 7079. 
 33  See, e.g., the  Open Skies Agreements case of 5 Nov. 2002 involving 8 Member States: Case C – 466/98, 
 Commission v. UK [2002] ECR I – 9427; Case C – 467/98,  Commission v. Denmark [2002] ECR I – 95; Case 
C – 468/98,  Commission v. Sweden [2002] ECR I – 9575; Case C – 369/98,  Commission v. Finland [2002] 
ECR I – 9627; Case C – 471/98,  Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I – 9681; Case C – 472/98,  Commission 
v. Luxembourg [2002] ECR I – 9741; Case C – 475/98,  Commission v. Austria [2002] ECR I – 9797; Case 
C – 476/98,  Commission v. Germany [2002] ECR I – 9855. 
 34  See Arts 3 – 6 of the Act of Danish, Irish, Norwegian, and UK Accession (the First Accession Treaty), OJ (1973) 
L 73/14; the Act of Greek Accession, OJ (1979) L 291/17; the Act of Iberian Accession, OJ (1985) L 302/23. 
See Arts 4 – 7 of the Act of Accession of Norway, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, OJ (1994) C 241/21. 
 35  See Documents concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic to the EU, OJ (2003) L 236/1; see especially 
the Act of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic, OJ (2003) L 236/33, at Art. 6. See also the Treaty concerning the 
Accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, OJ (2005) L 157/1 and especially the Act of Accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania, OJ (2005) L 157/203, Art. 6. 
 36  See Case 11/77,  Patrick v. Ministre des Affaires culturelles [1977] ECR 1199. If the accession treaty creates 
a derogation from a Treaty provision, it is to be read restrictively: see, e.g., Case 77/82,  Peskeloglou v. 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1983] ECR 1085. 
 37  See Arts. 10(6) and 12 of the Act of Accession of the Czech Republic, etc.,  supra note 35. 
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 The thorough review of the Member States ’ treaties on the occasion of the 2004 
accession has resulted in a paradoxical situation. Whereas the pre-existing inter-
national treaties of the 12 newcomers have, with only minor exceptions, been fully 
harmonized, the pre-existing engagements of the  ‘ old ’ members do not seem to have 
ever been processed in a comparable way. The case of bilateral trade agreements still 
maintained in force by some Member States, despite the exclusive nature of the EC’s 
external trade powers, is particularly revealing. 
 Shortly after the establishment of the common commercial policy (CCP), some 
Member States requested authorization to preserve bilateral commercial treaties with 
third parties. Even though the CCP implies the EC’s exclusive authority with respect 
to trade, the measure was aimed at reducing the practical impediments encountered 
by the young European Community, which lacked a well-equipped diplomatic serv-
ice. Surprisingly, the  ad hoc exception accorded for the ﬁ rst time in 1969 for a lim-
ited period has since been regularly renewed. 38 The last exception expired on 30 April 
2005. 39 Since then no action has been taken, despite the Commission’s proposal to 
include 17 bilateral trade agreements of the 10  ‘ 2004 ’ states in this special treat-
ment. 40 These trade agreements, the exemption of which from the general regime has 
not been renewed, are hence illegal under EC law. 
 European integration is an undertaking in progress 41 and, in consequence, the 
scope of the supranational powers changes shape over time to include new pow-
ers, including external ones. This means that the applicability of Article 307 is not 
exclusively attached to a precise time limit after which no international agreement 
may fall under its aegis. 42 The evolutionary nature of the EC’s competences makes 
this provision continuously operative. An international agreement concluded after 1 
January 1958 or after the dates of the various enlargements can still qualify if its con-
clusion precedes the emergence of a corresponding EC competence. Legal assessment 
of such agreements is incomparably trickier than the evaluation of the  ‘ pre-EC/EU ’ 
ones, since the birth of a new supranational power happens progressively and is often 
 38  See Council Dec 69/494/EEC of 16 Dec. 1969 on the progressive standardization of agreements concern-
ing commercial relations between Member States and third countries and on the negotiation of Commu-
nity agreements, OJ (1969) L 326/39. 
 39  The last exception so far was granted by Council Dec 2001/855/EC of 15 Nov. 2001 authorizing the 
automatic renewal or continuation in force of provisions governing matters covered by the common 
commercial policy contained in the friendship, trade and navigation treaties and trade agreements con-
cluded between Member States and third countries, OJ (2001) L 320/13. 
 40  Proposal for a Council Dec amending Council Dec 2001/855/EC of 15 Nov. 2001 in order to take ac-
count of certain treaties and trade agreements concluded with third countries by new Member States 
prior to their accession to the European Union, COM(2004)0697 ﬁ nal. 
 41  One of the main devices of European integration is to create an  ‘ ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe ’ : see the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome , supra note 8. 
 42  Otherwise, these dates would be easy to identify. For the original six members it would be the entry into 
force of the Rome Treaty, i.e., 1 Jan. 1958, for the other EU members the date of their respective acces-
sions: see the ﬁ rst Accession Treaty,  supra note 34; Greek Accession Treaty,  supra note 34; Treaty of Ibe-
rian Accession,  supra note 34; Treaty of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden,  supra note 34; Treaty 
of Accession of Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia,  supra note 34; Treaty of Bulgarian and Roumanian Accession,  supra note 35. 
 European Exceptionalism in International Law      475 
deﬁ nitively ascertained through litigation before one of the two European Courts. The 
ﬁ eld of external powers with respect to foreign direct investment seems to be undergo-
ing such a nascent moment, while Finland and Sweden are currently defending the 
legality of their bilateral investment treaties. 43 
 Despite these hurdles, the EC legal system is largely centralized and ultimately produces 
necessary solutions. These, however, count only within EC legal space, and not with 
respect to third states. Notwithstanding the legal consequences that Member States may 
face within the EU, third states are in principle entitled to insist on the timely and proper 
execution of treaty obligations. If the European enforcement mechanisms push the Mem-
ber States to harsh actions such as denunciations, the latter are left to face the full effects 
of their international liability towards third parties. The European states and institutions 
have thus focused their efforts on creating legal tools to preserve as many interests as pos-
sible. As the next part of this article reveals, to a large extent this challenge has been met. 
 3   Resolving Normative Conﬂ icts: Bringing EU-speciﬁ c 
Solutions into International Practice 
 International and EC law do not offer helpful solutions to normative conﬂ icts arising 
out of the EU Member States ’ obligations. The answer provided in the VCLT basically 
avoids the issue by allowing all conﬂ icting treaties to remain valid. As a result, the 
problem shifts from the ﬁ eld of the law of treaties to the ﬁ eld of state responsibility. The 
solution contained in Article 307 of the EC Treaty as applied by the European Courts 
is an efﬁ cient but radical option; it forces the Member States to renegotiate and even to 
terminate EU-inconsistent international engagements. 
 Daily international practice, nevertheless, requires answers that are effective but that 
do not unnecessarily disturb the course of inter-state relations. Hence, the European 
states, the EU, and also international institutions have come up with solutions aspiring to 
cure conﬂ icts without being inefﬁ cient or exceedingly aggressive. In this context, the EU 
states have had to defend the international compatibility of their EU duties with respect to 
the GATT, the WTO, the ECHR, and the UN Charter. Because the prevention of conﬂ icts 
is generally more desirable than subsequent complex litigation, European diplomacy has 
in this regard undertaken anticipatory steps in the form of the disconnection clause. 
 A   From the GATT to the WTO: Testing the International Speciﬁ city of 
the EC Treaty 
 Today the European Community is one of the most senior and economically one of the 
most important participants in multilateral trade talks. Despite the fragmentary nature 
of the EC Treaty provisions on external powers, the EC representatives became regu-
lar visitors to the GATT Geneva headquarters shortly after the Treaty of Rome entered 
into force. Since the early 1960s, the European institutions as well as the original EEC 
 43  Art. 188 C of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, places foreign direct investment under 
the competence of the EU [2007] OJ C306/01. 
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members have tried to persuade other GATT signatories to exempt the  ‘ Six ’ from the 
general GATT requirement of the most favoured nation clause (MFN clause). The ﬁ rst 
objective that the young integration process purported to achieve consisted in the estab-
lishment of a customs union, which, like every form of regional economic integration, is 
by deﬁ nition inconsistent with the GATT’s chief principle of non-discrimination. 44 
 The way out appeared easy, because the General Agreement itself contained a solu-
tion to this problem. The EEC Member States asserted the right to beneﬁ t from the 
exception under the GATT’s Article XXIV. By means of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this 
provision, the contracting parties recognized: 
 the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agree-
ments, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agree-
ments. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should 
be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of 
other contracting parties with such territories. 
 Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of 
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of 
an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area. 
The GATT, however, did not provide the promoters of European integration with a 
blank checque to depart from the general multilateral rules without conditions. Article 
XXIV speciﬁ es the limits of the internal and external economic effects of the integra-
tion enterprise. Accordingly, the Treaty of Rome underwent a thorough examination. 45 
The review lasted several years but did not produce any explicit conclusions concern-
ing compatibility, even though European integration was hugely criticized. Rather, the 
GATT parties progressively and tacitly recognized it as GATT-compatible. 46 
 In a similar way, institutional relations between the GATT and the EEC also took 
shape as a matter of practice, without an explicit textual basis. The GATT litigation 
record shows that during the period from 1947 to 1993, the EEC appeared on both 
defensive and offensive sides and represented common interests of the European states 
 vis-à-vis third parties. 47 
 Since January 1995, the EC has been a fully ﬂ edged WTO member alongside its 
Member States, whose autonomous role there has become very limited. 48 So much 
 44  Art. I of the GATT contains the most favoured nation clause. 
 45  XXX,  ‘ L’examen par le G.A.T.T. du Traité de Rome instituant la Communauté européenne ’ , 4  Annuaire 
Français du Droit International (1958) 621. 
 46  Haight ,  ‘ Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas Under GATT. A Reappraisal ’ , 8  J World Trade L (1972) 
391. Art. XXIV was implemented for the ﬁ rst time during the review of the custom union established 
between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia: see Report II/190 adopted on 18 May 1949. The second 
agreement examined pursuant to Art. XXIV was the free trade zone agreement concluded between El Sal-
vador and Nicaragua: see Dec II/32 of 25 Oct. 1951. After the adoption of a new review mechanism set 
up by the WTO in 1994, the regional agreements such as the EC treaty must be periodically reviewed. 
 47  The WTO dispute settlement documents list 21 cases: see at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_ e/dispu_e/
gt47ds_e.htm. 
 48  The Final Act of the Uruguay Round was concluded on 15 Dec. 1993 and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreement as well as its annexes entered into force on 1 Jan. 1994, 1867 UNTS 14. Art. XI(1) of 
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so that the EC – GATT and WTO symbiosis can be cited today as the most successful 
example of the Member States ’ international replacement by their supranational 
organization. 49 
 Under the GATT 1947 as well as under the WTO, the EU states beneﬁ t from the 
presence and negotiating power of the European Commission. In this context, third 
states have agreed to take into account the internal EU division of international trade 
powers. Hence, the question of standing in litigation involving the EC is generally easy 
to resolve. Yet, because the EC states remain sovereign members of the WTO, they 
can act here, at least in theory, in an autonomous manner, including in the dispute 
resolution procedure. This is, however, unlikely ever to happen, because such action 
would violate the domestic division of EU trade powers. An autonomous action by 
an EU member in the WTO could constitute a violation of EU law and bring about an 
infringement procedure. This information helps one to understand why, on rare occa-
sions, the WTO members direct their complaints to a group of individual EC members 
and not to the EC as a whole. The third states that engage in this strategy include 
mainly the United States, with which other states sometimes join. 50 These cases end 
up being managed by the supranational representatives anyway, and their signiﬁ -
cance seems to be purely political. Nevertheless, the possibility exists and reveals the 
legal intricacies of the EU states ’ international position. 
 In a recent decision,  European Communities  – Selected Customs Matters , the 
WTO Appellate Body took special care to avoid dealing with possible exter-
nal consequences of the internal EU division of powers. 51 The US attacked the 
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization mentions the  ‘ European Communities ’ and 
not the  ‘ European Union ’ as the WTO member. 
 49  For the legal assessment of different aspects of the EC’s participation within the GATT/WTO see , e.g., the 
decision in Case C – 93/02,  Biret International v. Council [2003] ECR I – 10497 or Case T – 90/03,  Fédération 
des industries condimentaires de France and others v. Commission [2007], not yet reported. 
 50  See Cases WT/DS67,  United Kingdom  – Customs Classiﬁ cation of Certain Computer Equipment , WT/DS68, 
 Ireland  – Customs Classiﬁ cation of Certain Computer Equipment , and WT/DS62,  European Communities 
 – Customs Classiﬁ cation of Certain Computer Equipment , panel report circulated on 5 Feb. 1998, Appellate 
Body report circulated on 5 June 1998. See also Cases WT/DS82, WT/DS83, and WT/DS115,  Meas-
ures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights concerning respectively Ireland, Denmark and 
European Communities, Mutually agreed solutions notiﬁ ed 13 June 2001 (Denmark) and 13 Sept. 2002. 
See also Cases WT/DS124,  European Communities  – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion 
Pictures and Television Programmes and WT/DS125,  Greece  – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for 
Motion Pictures and Television Programmes, Mutually agreed solutions notiﬁ ed 26 Mar. 2001. For other 
examples see Cases WT/DS172,  European Communities  – Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight 
Management System and WT/DS173,  France  – Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight Manage-
ment System, requests for consultation 21 May 1999, WT/DS210,  Belgium  – Administration of Measures 
Establishing Customs Duties for Rice , mutually agreed solution notiﬁ ed on 2 Jan. 2002, and WT/DS316, 
 European Communities and certain Member States  – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft , request 
for consultations received on 6 Oct. 2004. 
 51  Cases WT/DS315/1,  European Communities  – Selected Customs Matters , request for consultation by the 
US, 21 Sept. 2004; WT/DS315/AB/R,  European Communities  – Selected Customs Matters , Report of the 
Appellate Body, 13 Nov. 2006. For the analysis of the EC customs administration see paras 2.2 – 2.31 and 
7.155 ff of Panel report WT/DS315/R,  European Communities  – Selected Customs Matters , Report of the 
Panel, 16 June 2006. 
478 EJIL 19 (2008), 463–490
WTO-consistency of the European classification and valuation of products for cus-
toms purposes. 52 The peculiarity of the alleged violation stemmed from the mixed 
legal nature of its origins. Though framed by a number of EC regulations, the cus-
toms administration is traditionally executed by the national authorities of the EC 
members, as in the case of any other European law. Therefore, while identifying 
the allegedly invalid measures, the US referred not only to supranational legisla-
tion but also to  ‘ the myriad forms of administration of these measures ’ 53 intro-
duced by the Member States ’ customs authorities. The US denounced as WTO-
inconsistent: 
 ‘ the design and the structure ’ of the European customs system, organized through twenty-
ﬁ ve  ‘ separate, independent customs authorities [in that it] does not provide any institution 
or mechanism to reconcile divergences automatically and as a matter of right when they 
occur. 54 
 Partially accepting the American claim, the Appellate Body declined the invitation to 
disapprove the European customs system  ‘ as a whole ’ . 55 Pointing to the insufﬁ cient 
factual ﬁ ndings in the panel’s report on this issue, the permanent WTO judicial body 
could consequently avoid addressing the intricate question of the external legal effects 
of the EC domestic division of powers between supranational institutions, on the one 
hand, and the Member States, on the other. 
 The  Selected Customs Matters case demonstrates the particularly challenging inter-
national situation that the European integration process can bring about for EU Mem-
ber States. Although none of the states was targeted individually in the American 
complaint, any of them could have been. The European Commission would certainly 
have stepped in, and very likely would have handled the dispute. But one can recall 
that the EC origin of the national customs measures is rather remote and their imme-
diate cause is national. One the other hand, the whole enterprise of European inte-
gration rests on the capacities of the Member States to implement and administer EC 
law. As already mentioned, the latter feature is a part of EU domestic arrangements 
that third states may or may not consider. Within the WTO, it is generally the case 
because the EC usually shelters the EU states from claims denouncing a measure of 
the EU as WTO-inconsistent. This is not necessarily the case in other international 
fora where the EC or EU has not acquired full membership. Two prominent illustra-
tions are the ECHR and the UN Charter, neither of which allows for the participation 
of international subjects others than states. In respect to both, the EU has engendered 
law with non-negligible effects that may call into question the international liability 
of EU states. 
 52  European Communities  – Selected Customs Matters, request for establishment of a panel by the USA, 14 Jan. 
2005, WT/DS315/8. 
 53  Ibid . 
 54  Panel Report,  supra note 51, at para. 69. 
 55  Ibid ., at para. 7.64 and Appellate Body Report,  supra note 51, at paras 271 – 287. 
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 B   Curing Normative Conﬂ icts: the International Liability of EU 
Member States Relating to the Execution of European Law 
 All EU states are parties to the ECHR 56 and to the UN Charter, 57 whereas the EU itself is 
not. The EC and the EU have, nevertheless, developed activities that touch upon questions 
of human rights and international security. Without aiming speciﬁ cally at implementing 
the ECHR, the European legislation happened to affect its execution by the EU states. Con-
sequently, the latter have had to face complaints lodged in this regard before the ECtHR. 
 In contrast, the obligations that the EU Member States assume within the UN have 
not been negatively affected by their common European enterprise. To the contrary, 
the EU institutions are deploying considerable efforts to implement the EU states ’ UN 
duties. Besides raising questions as to its legal basis, this assistance cannot shield Euro-
pean states against problems that an inaccurate EU-driven implementation of the UN 
Charter may provoke. 
 1   The European Convention on Human Rights: the Presumption that EU Law is 
Consistent with Human Rights 
 Even though the ECHR allows for inter-state litigation, the ECtHR has dealt with inter-
state complaints only four times up to now. 58 The remaining case load has consisted of 
actions by individual plaintiffs. The EU states have had to defend several pieces of legis-
lation implemented as a direct obligation arising out of their EU membership. Several 
cases brought before the European Commission of Human Rights and ECtHR opened 
the question whether the responsibility of an EU state could be engaged, even though 
that state was not the immediate author of the challenged measure. 59 The ECtHR did 
not consider the fact that the alleged infringement stemmed from the implementation 
of EU duties as a mitigating circumstance. Nevertheless, the judges devoted several 
thoughts to the complexity of the EU Member States ’ legal situation. The classical 
examples of the relevant case law are the  Matthews 60 and  Bosphorus 61 decisions. 
 The judgment in the  Matthews case arose out of a complaint brought by a British 
citizen and resident of Gibraltar after her application to be registered as a voter in the 
elections to the European Parliament was turned down. It was explained to her that, 
pursuant to the European Community Act on Direct Elections of 1976, 62 Gibraltar 
 56  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 Nov. 1950, which en-
tered into force on 3 Sept. 1953, ETS 5, 213 UNTS 222. 
 57  Supra note 2. 
 58  For the most recent example see the application lodged by Georgia against the Russian Federation on 27 
Mar. 2007. The previous ones were  Ireland v. UK (1978);  Denmark v. Turkey (2000), and  Cyprus v. Turkey 
(2001). A further 17 inter-state applications were dealt with by the European Commission of Human 
Rights, abolished in 1999. 
 59  See, e.g., App No 8030/77, CFDT v. European Communities, 13 D and R 231, at 239 – 240; see also App 
No. 13258/87,  M & Co v. Germany, 64 D and R 138; App No. 24833/94,  Matthews v. UK (Grand Cham-
ber),1999-I at 305; App No. 36677/97,  SA Dangeville v. France , 2002-III at 71. 
 60  Matthews v. UK ,  supra note 59. 
 61  App No. 45036/98,  Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirket v. Ireland (Grand Chamber), 
judgment of 30 June 2005, 42 EHRR (2006) 1. See Hoffmeister ,  supra note 3. 
 62  See Dec 76/787 of the representatives of the Member States meeting in the Council relating to the Act con-
cerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, OJ (1976) L 278/1. 
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was not included in the franchise. Exclusion from the franchise was effected multi-
laterally by the EC states ’ common decision, which modiﬁ ed the text of the founding 
documents of the Community. Therefore, the ECtHR had to review provisions of EC 
primary law. 
 The applicant denounced the decision of the Gibraltar authorities as a violation of 
her right to choose the legislature as guaranteed in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
ECHR. After conﬁ rming that the latter provision is applicable in Gibraltar, the ECtHR 
addressed the issue in a three-pronged analysis. First, the judges assessed whether the 
United Kingdom could be held responsible for the lack of elections to the European 
Parliament in Gibraltar, given that the act under review originated in the EC. The 
Court observed that it was incompetent to review EC acts as such, because the EC 
was not a party to the ECHR. Nevertheless, the Court did not accept the British argu-
ment that no effective control could be exercised over the challenged act. 63 Instead 
the Court remarked that the parties to the Convention remained fully responsible for 
its execution. The fact of entering subsequent international treaties, such as the EC 
Treaty, could not absolve them from their pre-existing obligations under the Euro-
pean Convention. 64 
 Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 uses the term  ‘ legislature ’ . In the second part of its analy-
sis the ECtHR had to answer the question whether the term also covers an elected body 
of a supranational nature such as the European Parliament. The Court concluded that 
the ambit of the Article is not limited to domestic bodies and can therefore be applied 
to the European Parliament as well. In the third part of their reasoning, the judges 
examined the real functions that the Parliament exercised with respect to Gibraltar 
in the relevant period. Compared to its national counterparts, the European Parlia-
ment does not have the full range of competences, and the British defence focused 
on this point. The Court held, however, that the body was sufﬁ ciently involved in the 
legislative process within the EC to qualify as a  ‘ legislature ’ under Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1. 65 The ECtHR took into account the speciﬁ c nature of the supranational legal 
system of the EC to hold that the European Parliament could be equated with a domes-
tic legislative body. 66 The Court considered the progressive increase in the European 
Parliament’s powers and thus departed from the case law established on this point by 
the European Commission of Human Rights. 67 As a result, the implementation of an 
EC act by the United Kingdom led the Court to the conclusion that the latter had failed 
in its duty to safeguard the right to a  ‘ free expression of the people in the choice of the 
legislature ’ . 68 
 63  Matthews v. UK ,  supra note 59, at para. 26. 
 64  Ibid ., at paras 32 – 34. The ECHR was adopted in 1950, but the Rome Treaty several years later in 1957. 
 65  Ibid ., at paras 38 – 44. 
 66  See the dissenting opinions by Judges Sir John Freeland and Karel Jungwiert. 
 67  Ibid ., at para. 50; see App No. 8364/78,  Lindsay v. UK , 15 Decisions and Reports 247, and App No. 
11123/84,  Tête v. France , 54 Decisions and Reports 52. 
 68  See also  SA Dangeville v. France ,  supra note 59, and App Nos 49217/99 and 49218/99,  SA Cabinet Diot 
and SA Gras Savoye v. France , 3 Sept. 2002 . 
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 The  Matthews case has shown the potential risk to which EU Member States 
are exposed while implementing EU primary legislation. A recent decision of the 
ECtHR makes it clear, however, that  Matthews -like decisions will probably remain 
exceptional and that the Court is ready to exercise considerable self-restraint when 
confronted with EU-related claims, even in the context of EC secondary law. The  Bos-
phorus decision 69 involved a complex case implicating the laws of the ECHR, the EU, 
and the UN Charter. As in  Matthews , an EU Member State had to face allegations that 
by implementing an EU law it violated the ECHR. 
 The applicant, a Turkish airline company, leased an aircraft from Yugoslav Air-
lines which, while in Ireland, was seized by the Irish authorities pursuant to an EC 
Council Regulation. 70 The regulation implemented the UN sanctions adopted against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). These sanctions were 
later relaxed and the aircraft was returned to the owner. Subsequently, the applicant 
denounced a violation of his right to protection of property, guaranteed under Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. Ireland hence faced a difﬁ cult situation. The chal-
lenge was directed against an Irish measure which, though implemented by national 
authorities, was adopted in the supranational decision-making process over which 
Ireland had only very limited control. On this point, the ECtHR noted that the EC Reg-
ulation in question was  ‘ generally applicable ’ ,  ‘ binding in its entirety ’ , and  ‘ directly 
applicable ’ , and that, in consequence, no Member State could lawfully depart from it. 
The Court observed as well that the Irish authorities were right to consider themselves 
obliged to impound any aircraft to which the EC regulation applied, and that in this 
exercise they had no discretion. 
 However, the fact that Ireland was bound by EC law could not absolve it from its 
duties under the ECHR. Thus, the European Court subsequently inquired into whether 
the impounding constituted a violation of the Convention. On this point, the Court pos-
ited an important presumption in favour of the consistency of EC law with the ECHR. 
Taking into account the speciﬁ city of the EU states ’ engagement under the EC Treaty, 
it held that the protection of fundamental rights by EC law could have been consid-
ered  ‘ equivalent to that of the Convention system ’ . This is a critical step in the Court’s 
reasoning. It implies that the ECtHR will exercise signiﬁ cant self-restraint whenever 
the lawfulness of a national measure implementing an EC rule is in question. But this 
leniency is not without conditions. As the Court explained, the presumption can be 
rebutted if the protection of fundamental rights is manifestly deﬁ cient. Because this 
was not the situation in the case at hand, Ireland was found not to be in violation of 
any of its obligations under the European convention. 
 It is rather difﬁ cult to predict under what circumstances the presumption of the 
consistency of EU law with the ECHR can be rebutted. One can foresee that the ECtHR 
will exercise particular caution before accepting a rebuttal. The perception of EC law 
as generally respectful of human rights will most likely lead the judges in Strasburg to 
 69  See  supra note 61. 
 70  Council Reg 990/93/EEC, of 26 Apr. 1993 concerning trade between the European Economic Commu-
nity and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), OJ (1993) L 102/1. 
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remain deferential. Even though the context is very different, there is a good chance 
that as with the WTO, the presumption of the consistency of European rules will gen-
eralize also in the ﬁ eld of human rights. 
 Although the EU is not a UN member, the supranational institutions repeat-
edly carry out the EU Member States ’ duties under the UN Charter, and especially 
their obligation to bring into effect Security Council (SC) resolutions. This practice 
presents a considerable practical advantage, but it becomes problematic regarding 
the question whether the EU or its members will face international responsibil-
ity if EU implementation fails to comply with UN standards. Unlike the European 
system of human rights protection, the UN Charter does not give rise to much liti-
gation. However, this traditional situation recently recorded interesting develop-
ments when private parties challenged the UN-consistency of EU legislation before 
the CFI and ECJ. 
 2   Implementing the Charter of the United Nations: the European Way 
 Recently, several EU acts were adopted to carry out the Security Council’s Chapter 
VII anti-terrorist resolutions. Without being a UN member, the EU can establish 
links with the world organization in various ways, especially in the context of 
UN Chapter VIII. 71 No UN Charter provision, however, provides for the partici-
pation of international organizations. Obligations are hence addressed to the UN 
member states only. Yet, the systematic implementation of UN duties by means 
of the EC/EU framework has manifestly become the vehicle for EU states ’ compli-
ance. Because the Security Council resolutions are addressed to UN members, and 
because the EU is not among them, the questions arise as to the legal basis upon 
which EU implementation is anchored, as well as to the corresponding liability for 
faulty execution. 72 
 The practical advantage of the situation is beyond any doubt. Supranational legis-
lation generates a uniﬁ ed and efﬁ cient response to SC decisions. The European insti-
tutions have turned out to be a rather committed actor in this ﬁ eld, and third states 
seem to approve the practice. Nevertheless, in the past few years a substantial number 
of private challenges have been brought before the EU Courts. This situation has led 
the EU judges to assess the legal basis that allows the EU to implement UN obligations. 
The European judges have executed this task with a great deal of originality, which 
has not gone without criticism. In the  Yusuf and  Kadi decisions 73 the Court of First 
Instance linked, with unexpected obiter conclusions, several legal grounds to justify 
 71  Ch. XIII deals with regional agreements established to deal with the matters related to the maintenance 
of international peace and security. 
 72  On the issue of international responsibility of the EU/EC see generally Kuijper and Paasivirta ,  ‘ Does 
One Size Fit All?: The European Community and the Responsibility of International Organizations ’ , 36 
 Netherlands Yrbk Int’l L (2005) 169; Kuijper and Paasivirta ,  supra note 3. 
 73  Case T – 306/01,  Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR 
II – 3533, currently under appeal; Case T – 315/01,  Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II – 3649, 
currently under appeal. See  ‘ Editorial Comments, Hegemonic International Law Revisited ’ , 97  AJIL (2003) 
873; S. Za š ova,  ‘ La lutte contre le terrorisme à l ’ épreuve de la jurisprudence du Tribunal de première in-
stance des Communautés européennes ’ , 74  Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (forthcoming, 2008). 
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supranational involvement in the UN terrain, and even to deduce its own exceptional 
power to review the SC resolutions ’ conformity with the norms of  ius cogens . 74 
 The facts were remote from the adoption of a series of EC measures executing the UN 
sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 75 Based on the SC resolutions, 
the Community froze the funds of several entities, including two Swedish companies. 
These attacked the EC measures, denouncing a violation of their fundamental rights 
to property and to a hearing. The CFI considered it necessary to establish ﬁ rst the EC’s 
relationship with the UN and then to verify its powers to review the SC’s decisions, to 
which, in its opinion, the review of the challenged acts amounted. 
 On the ﬁ rst point, the CFI concluded that while the EU was not a UN member, it had suc-
ceeded to its Member States ’ UN obligations. The Court then combined various provisions 
of the EC Treaty to deduce that the EU was competent to implement measures relating to 
the maintenance of international piece and security. The European judges then observed 
that, as a matter of principle, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the SC’s resolution 
except, however, when the resolution allegedly violated norms of  ius cogens . This state-
ment has provoked numerous scholarly comments because of its direct opposition to Arti-
cle 103 of the UN Charter. For the ﬁ rst time in international history, a regional court has 
declared its competence to set aside a binding SC Chapter VII resolution. The exercise of 
this power seems to be strictly limited to the question of  ius cogens , but this limitation has 
been counterbalanced by the very wide reading that the CFI gave to the latter term. 
 The question of the legal basis of the European UN-related action are today gov-
erned by  Kadi and  Yusuf . The intriguing question of legal consequences should the 
European implementing legislation prove to be inconsistent with UN obligations, 
however, remains open. Will the Member States be held liable in such a situation? 
Will they have to give priority to the original version of the SC resolutions, pursuant 
to Article 103 of the UN Charter, 76 or will they have to apply the EU interpretation 
 74  In the Lockerbie Case the ICJ held that  prima facie the US and Libya had to respect SC resolutions notwith-
standing any other legal obligation. Indication of provisional measures asked for by Libya would  ‘ impair 
the rights  … enjoyed by the United State by the virtue of Security Council resolution 748 (1992) ’ . So far, 
the case has not advanced to the merits stage, so the ICJ has not yet had occasion to decide the question 
of possible review of the SC resolution. 
 75  EU Council Reg 467/2001 of 6 Mar. 2001 on the prohibition of the export of certain goods and services 
to Afghanistan, strengthening of the ﬂ ight ban, and extending the freeze of funds and other ﬁ nancial 
resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, OJ (2001) L 67/1; Commission Reg 2199/2001 of 
12 Nov. 2001, OJ (2001) L 295/16 and Council Reg 2062/2001 of 19 Oct. 2001, OJ (2001) L 277/25; 
Council Reg 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain speciﬁ c restrictive measures directed against 
certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network, and the Taliban, OJ 
(2002) L 139/9. 
 76  ‘ In the event of a conﬂ ict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present 
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail. ’ On this point see the commentary by Koskenniemi and Leino ,  ‘ Fragmen-
tation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties ’ , 15  Leiden J Int’l L  (2002) 553, at 559:  ‘ if the UN 
Charter  really was a constitution of mankind, its character as such could be derived neither from popular 
legitimacy nor sociological effectiveness. Even as Article 103 may seem like a constitutional provision, 
few would conﬁ dently use it to uphold the primacy of Security Council decisions over, for examples, hu-
man rights treaties. ’ 
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instead? There is no doubt that the states remain wholly and exclusively responsible 
for meeting the terms of SC resolutions, to which Article 103 of the UN Charter gives 
priority. The functional advantage of the co-ordinated EU implementation, EU devo-
tion to the UN cause, and the truly problematic legal and political consequences of a 
contrary solution make it likely that any foreseeable litigation will rely on some ver-
sion of the supranational exception or presumption in favour of the consistency of EU 
acts with the UN Charter. 
 The incidents provoked by the external negative impacts of EU law compel EU insti-
tutions and the EU states to search for legal tools that will eliminate, or at least reduce, 
the risk of their occurrence. Even though their rationale is far from being limited to 
this end, disconnection clauses are a distinctive legal instrument that European diplo-
macy has introduced into international practice in order to avoid normative conﬂ icts 
and accommodate the needs of integration. 
 C  Preventing Normative Conﬂ icts: the Policy of Disconnection Clauses 
 On 20 October 2005, a majority of the UNESCO member states adopted the Conven-
tion on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Diver-
sity Convention). 77 The result of intense negotiations, the Diversity Convention has 
today gathered 146 signatories, including all EU Member States and the European 
Community. 78 This last is not a UNESCO member. However, while the negotiating 
process was under way, the European institutions attempted to design a uniﬁ ed nego-
tiation position that the EU members would adopt. This agenda invited Member States 
to make efforts to ensure that the following provision became part of the ﬁ nal text: 
 Notwithstanding the rules of the present Convention, those Parties which are members of a 
regional economic integration organization constituted by sovereign States to which their 
member States have transferred competence over matters governed by this Convention, shall 
apply in their mutual relations the common rules in force in that regional economic integra-
tion organization. 79 
In the draft, the provision was placed after the current Article 30 dealing with federal 
or non-unitary constitutional systems, 80 but in the end it did not win support from the 
other negotiating parties. Had it been accepted and incorporated into the ﬁ nal text, 
 77  The United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁ c and Cultural Organization. The Convention entered into force 
on 18 Mar. 2007, available at:  http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID  =  31038&URL_DO  =  DO_ 
TOPIC&URL_SECTION  =  201.html. 
 78  The EC acceded on 18 Dec. 2005: Council Dec 2006/515/EC of 18 May 2006 on the conclusion of the 
Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural expressions, OJ (2006) L 201/15. See Art. 27(3) 
of the Convention, detailing conditions upon which a regional organization may accede. 
 79  The provision was entitled  ‘ Regional economic integration organizations ’ : archived document of the EU 
Council, 22 April 2005, 7962/05, JUR 156 CULT 21. 
 80  And which differentiates between the duties of the central governments with respect to the execution of 
the convention:  ‘ [r]ecognizing that international agreements are equally binding on Parties regardless of 
their constitutional systems, the following provisions shall apply to Parties which have a federal or non-
unitary constitutional system: (a) with regard to the provisions of this Convention, the implementation of 
which comes under the legal jurisdiction of the federal or central legislative power, the obligations of the 
federal or central government shall be the same as for those Parties which are not federal States; (b) with 
regard to the provisions of the Convention, the implementation of which comes under the jurisdiction of 
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the statement would have become the most recent example of what have become 
known as  ‘ disconnection clauses ’ . 81 These clauses are currently included in two 
dozen multilateral agreements. By their means, the EU states  ‘ disconnect ’ themselves 
from the general regime of the treaty, to the extent that the subject matter is covered 
by EU/EC law and only as far as their mutual relations are concerned. The content 
of disconnection clauses varies from one treaty to another, but it can be expressed as 
follows: 
 Notwithstanding the rules of the present Convention, those Parties which are members of the 
European Economic Community shall apply in their mutual relations the common rules in force 
in that Community. 82 
This instrument has not gone without criticism. Concerns have recently been 
expressed about the risks that this practice represents for the unity of a given treaty 
regime and also for the international system as such, should this course of action 
become frequent . 83 
 The disconnection clauses seem to challenge, if not contradict, the well established 
principle of relative effect of treaties 84 by making intra-EU rules internationally oppos-
able to third states. The EU members claim by this means a right to detach themselves 
from a negotiated regime. However astounding this may be, disconnection clauses 
have acquired the status of positive law because other signatories have acquiesced in 
them. 
 If the practice of disconnection is followed by other states, it may make little sense to 
work for difﬁ cult multilateral compromises only to watch them collapse into disparate 
legal obligations afterwards. It is presumably for this reason that in its recent work on 
the fragmentation of international law, the International Law Commission (ILC) is 
rather critical of this tool without, however, being explicit about the reasons. 85 
 To date such clauses can be found in approximately 17 conventions. 86 They have 
known the greatest ﬂ amboyance around the negotiation table at the Council of Europe. 
individual constituent units such as States, counties, provinces, or cantons which are not obliged by the 
constitutional system of the federation to take legislative measures, the federal government shall inform, 
as necessary, the competent authorities of constituent units such as States, counties, provinces or cantons 
of the said provisions, with its recommendation for their adoption ’ . 
 81  Upon its ratiﬁ cation the EC issued the following declaration:  ‘ [a]s regards Community competences de-
scribed in the Declaration  … , the Community is bound by the Convention and will ensure its due im-
plementation. It follows that the Member States of the Community which are party to the Convention 
in their mutual relations apply the provision of the Convention in accordance with the Community’s 
internal rules and without prejudice to appropriate amendments being made to these rules ’ : Council Dec 
2006/515 EC,  supra note 78, Annex II. 
 82  Art. 27 of the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 1988 quoted in 
Koskenniemi,  supra note 21, at 148, para. 289  in ﬁ ne . See also Goldsmith,  ‘ The Unexceptional U.S. 
Human Rights RUDs ’ , 3  U St Thomas LJ (2005) 311. 
 83  See Koskenniemi,  supra note 21, at 148. 
 84  See Art. 30 VCLT,  supra note 19. 
 85  See Koskenniemi,  supra note 21, at 148 ff. For critical comments see Economidès and Kolliopoulus , ’ La clause 
de déconnexion en faveur du droit communautaire: une pratique critiquable ’ , 110  RGDIP (2006) 273. 
 86  See Koskenniemi,  supra note 21, para. 289. 
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The need for such provisions is being justiﬁ ed by the capacity of the EC to develop a 
dense normative system that goes far beyond what traditional intergovernmental co-
operation is able to generate. Also, it is suggested that the supranational endeavour 
will unavoidably be frustrated if its external ramiﬁ cations are not co-ordinated and if 
the international action of the EU states lacks a common line. 
 The rules of the European Commission’s and the Council’s archives allow only lim-
ited access to recent documents. Hence, it is not possible to say with accuracy what the 
line of reasoning on this issue is. For example, when the negotiations on the UNESCO 
Convention on Cultural Diversity 87 were in process, the Legal Service of the Council 
of the EU delivered an opinion explaining that the inclusion of a disconnection clause 
was appropriate. 88 The proposal contains the traditional wording 89 of the clause, but 
the 12-page discussion about its justiﬁ cation remains classiﬁ ed. 90 Basically two sets 
of reasons are put forward in this context. The ﬁ rst set concerns relations between 
Member States and third parties, while the second reﬂ ects the features of the EU legal 
order. The international argument goes as follows. The growing breadth of the EU’s 
external powers makes it increasingly difﬁ cult for the Member States to survey the 
consistency of their international engagements with EU law. Deepening discomfort 
about the situation has led the EU states and institutions to promote disconnection 
clauses as a tool to ensure that EU states ’ international engagements will not become 
an obstacle to EU domestic evolution. Third states in consequence lose the legal abil-
ity to request EU members to apply the multilateral rules in their mutual relations. 
However, the proponents of disconnection clauses argue that third parties can hardly 
ever be affected by intra-European developments, because the latter are limited to the 
EU Member States ’ relations  inter se and because, with respect to third countries, the 
multilateral obligations remain in force. On this point, one can ask whether it will 
always be easy to draw a clear line between  ‘ legal relations between EU Member States 
 inter se ’ , on the one hand, and their relations towards third states, on the other. Some 
multilateral treaties regulate subjects such as the prevention of arms sales or illegal 
drug trafﬁ cking, and their efﬁ ciency clearly depends on the co-operation of all parties 
involved. Any fragmentation of the established regime may thus threaten the success 
of this objective. 91 
 87  Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,  supra note 77. 
 88  Document of the EU Council 7962/05,  supra note 79. 
 89  Art. 29 bis of the Council proposal states:  ‘ [r]egional economic integration organizations: Notwith-
standing the rules of the present Convention, those Parties which are member of a regional economic 
integration organization constituted by sovereign States to which their member States have transferred 
competence over matters governed by this Convention, shall apply in their mutual relations the common 
rules in force in that regional economic integration organization ’ ,  supra note 79. 
 90  For another example see the Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the 1992 Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and to the 1992 Conven-
tion on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, signed on 21 May 2003 in Kiev. 
 91  In a slightly different context, Warner AG suggested the utility of distinguishing between agreements the 
full execution of which can be achieved only by the mutual teamwork of all signatories on the one hand, 
and purely bilateral ones, on the other: Case 34/79,  R. v. Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795, Opinion of 
 European Exceptionalism in International Law      487 
 The idea that two or more parties to a multilateral treaty cannot  ‘ disconnect ’ them-
selves from the general rule without impeding the common goal merits consideration. 
By exempting the whole group of EU states from a multilateral regime, the clause cre-
ates a legal enclave the extent and implications of which may be hard to assess. The 
defence of the European position can, however, build upon empirical evidence show-
ing that the European rules tend to be stricter and more detailed than the multilateral 
ones. 92 As such, they can hardly disturb multilateral enterprises, although this con-
clusion must be assessed over time. On the other hand, if European regulation merely 
runs beyond the basic multilateral standard, this argument conﬂ icts with a parallel 
justiﬁ cation of the clause according to which the clause is said to prevent inconsisten-
cies and EU states ’ international responsibility should a conﬂ ict arise. 
 Despite this curious logic, one can understand the efforts to secure a pragmatic safe-
guard against litigation. The fact that the EU states give away a large amount of their 
normative powers makes them vulnerable whenever their international obligations 
entitle third states to require speciﬁ c action. They may no longer be able to embrace 
such conduct, in which case they will have to rely on the EC institutions ’ diligence. 
 Under this perspective, the disconnection policy recalls features of the federal clause. 
By this means, federal states waive their international responsibility for the execution 
of a given treaty in so far as its subject matter cannot be administered by the national 
governments because of particular restrictions arising from federalism. 93 While 
recently ratifying the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its 
two protocols, 94 the USA introduced a reservation referring to  ‘ fundamental princi-
ples of federalism ’ by which the American government refused to criminalize matters 
of  ‘ purely local character ’ . The reservation explained that federal criminal law does 
not apply in situations where the conduct  ‘ does not  … involve interstate or foreign 
Warner AG, at 3818. According to some commentators, the AG’s ﬁ rst category implicitly referred to mul-
tilateral treaties establishing so-called objective regimes, even though this term has a speciﬁ c meaning in 
the law of succession in treaties. For a commentary see Cohen-Jonathan,  supra note 30, at 1497 – 1508. 
 92  See EU Council Doc 8799/95 of 6 July 1995, JUSTCIV 40, from the (Spanish) Presidency to the Group 
Directeur III  ‘ Conclusions du séminaire  “ Aspects internationaux de la séparation et du divorce: prob-
lématique dans l’Union européenne ” ’ . Foreseeing the possible conclusion of a new convention on the 
subject by the EU States  inter se (title VI of the EU Treaty), the Spanish presidency suggested,  inter alia , that 
a disconnection clause be included in the new convention  ‘ in order to ensure the compatibility ’ between 
the latter and the Brussels and other conventions ( ‘ d’assurer la compatibilité entre la Convention de Bruxelles 
II et d’autres conventions internationales par le biais de clauses de déconnexion ’ ). 
 93  See as one of the ﬁ rst examples Art. XI of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of 10 June 1958 (New York Convention), available at: www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html. See generally Hollis ,  ‘ Executive Federalism: Forging 
New Federalist Constraint on the Treaty Power ’ ,  79  S California. L Rev  (2006) 1327; Liang,  ‘ Notes on Le-
gal Questions Concerning the United Nations: Colonial Clauses and Federal Clauses in U.N. Multilateral 
Instruments ’ , 45  AJIL  (1951) 108. 
 94  Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafﬁ cking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafﬁ cking Protocol), and the Protocol Against 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Migrant Smuggling Protocol), 15 Nov. 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 108-16, UN Doc. A/Res/55/25, available at: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_ signatures.
html and quoted by Hollis ,  supra note 93, at 1361. 
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commerce, or another federal interest ’ . As with the relationship between disconnec-
tion clauses and EU law, the federal clause at the international level provokes the 
domestic limitations that federalism imposes on the federal government. In this way, 
the federal government absolves itself from international obligations requiring legis-
lation that would intrude into ﬁ elds falling within the traditional competence of the 
states. Disconnection as well as federal clauses hence reﬂ ect national governments ’ 
concern to shield themselves from international liability for actions or omissions that 
escape their immediate control. 
 Besides international considerations, disconnection clauses reﬂ ect an important 
concern speciﬁ c to the EU domestic legal system. Disconnection clauses appear both 
in treaties in which the EC cannot participate (e.g., conventions within the Council of 
Europe) and in mixed agreements, i.e., international treaties in which both the EC and 
the Member States participate. International agreements entered into by the EC auto-
matically become part of the European legal system, where they are endowed with 
legal force that trumps secondary EC legal norms. This principle is partly anchored 
in Article 300(7) of the EC Treaty and has partly been developed by the ECJ. 95 Hence, 
it may be possible for a Member State successfully to resist a duty to implement an 
EC norm by claiming that the latter would amount to a violation of an international 
agreement to which the EC and the Member States had subscribed. By ensuring the 
priority application of the domestic EU regime, disconnection clauses defeat such a 
strategy in advance. In this sense, before the adoption of the European Council Con-
vention on Cybercrime of 2001, 96 the Commission argued that the insertion of a dis-
connection clause was a matter of great importance. 97 The Commission explained 
 95  Case 181/73,  Haegeman v. Belgium [1974] ECR 449; Case 104/81,  Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg 
[1982] ECR 3641; Case 12/86,  Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719; Case C – 312/91, 
 Metalsa [1993] ECR I – 3773; Case C – 158/91,  Ministère public et Direction du travail et de l’emploi v. Jean-
Claude Levy [1993] ECR I – 4306, para. 19; Case C – 432/92,  The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd [1994] ECR I – 3134, para. 50; Case C – 327/91,  France v. 
Commission [1994] ECR I – 3674, para. 25; Case T – 115/94,  Opel Austria GmbH v. Council [1994] ECR II –
 70, paras 90 – 91; Case C – 286/90,  Anklagemyndigheden v. P.M. Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp [1992] 
ECR I – 6052, at 6054, paras 16 and 26 – 27; Case C – 316/91,  Parliament v. Council [1994] ECR I – 646, 
para. 69. With respect to international custom see Case 48/69,  Imperial Chemical Industries v. Commis-
sion [1972] ECR 619. See also Case C – 162/96,  A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR 
I – 3655. 
 96  Art. 39(2) of the Convention. The Convention was signed on 23 Nov. 2001 and entered into force on 
1 Jan. 2004, CETs No. 185. It is open only to states and not to international organizations. The text of 
the Convention is available at:  http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/ Html/185.htm or 41 ILM 
(2002) 282. 
 97  The proposition included not only the well known reference to the priority of the EC rules but equally of 
the EU ones, adopted pursuant to Title VI of the EU Treaty. In the same document, the Commission advo-
cates the EC participation clause. The Commission acknowledges that the EC had not yet acquired powers 
in the ﬁ eld, which, according to the Commission, must however be just a matter of time. The Commission 
pointed to the precedent of an anticipatory clause in the Council of Europe convention 164 of 4 Apr. 
1997: EU Council archived document 6643/01, obtained in French, of 27 Feb. 2001, CRIMORG 23, 
 ‘ [n]ote de transmission, Emetteur Bernhard Zepter, Secrétaire Général Adjoint de la Commission Européenne, 
destinateur Javier Solana, Secrétaire Général/haut représentant Projet de Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur 
le Cyber-criminalité  – adhésion de la CE et clause de déconnexion ’ , Commission doc SEC(2001) 315 of 19 Feb. 
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that the clause was necessary to ensure legal clarity and to make every EU state’s 
national rule based upon the convention consistent with EC law. The Commission 
hence revealed that the main objective of the disconnection clause was not to depart 
from international standards, but to ensure that these did not hamper the implemen-
tation of European law. 
 The continuing discussions on the subject of disconnection clauses show that the 
issue is likely to lead to interesting developments. Its signiﬁ cance lies, however, in the 
fact that it is part of a broader tendency that European diplomacy promotes in order 
to shield the supranational endeavour against the disturbing effects of international 
law. If the EU succeeds, its endeavour has the chance to become the casebook example 
of international law fragmentation and a perfect example with which to open or close 
lectures on the hierarchy of international norms. There is no particular reason to be 
much concerned about it, because: 
 The I.C.J., human rights bodies, a trade regime or a regional exception may each be used for 
good or ignoble purposes and it should be a matter of debate and evidence and not of abstract 
 ‘ consistency ’ , as to which institutions should be preferred in a particular situation. 98 
What else can one add? This quotation is perfectly tailored to the European case and to 
the diverse legal tools by which the European instances and EU Member States promote 
the European regional exception in the landscape of international co-operation. In 
diverse forms and fora, the exception has been advanced for almost  half a century and 
has been, to a great extent, accepted or at least tolerated. The question that remains 
open is to what extent this exception should be presumed as a matter of custom. 
 4   Conclusion: Is the European Exception Making its Way 
into International Law? 
 The transfer of powers to European supranational institutions and the resulting con-
straints on the domestic as well as external conduct of the 27 EU members is trans-
forming on a daily basis the international legal condition of these states. The EU has 
developed a complex international practice. Its legal rules relating to external rela-
tions impose constraints primarily on the EU Member States, but by deﬁ nition they 
also affect third parties. This is particularly so whenever EU members have to recon-
sider and review bilateral or multilateral engagements entered into with third parties. 
The latter are often entitled to insist on these engagements being honoured and they 
may also trigger the Member States ’ international responsibility. 
 The EU members must hence deploy their best diplomatic efforts in order to obtain 
third parties ’ concessions permitting them to embrace their EU obligations fully with-
out infringing international ones. In many instances the European states together 
with European institutions have succeeded in this difﬁ cult exercise. With regard to 
2001, Document de travail des services de la Commission, Projet de Convention du Conseil de l’Europe 
sur la Cyber–criminalité  – adhésion de la CE et clause de déconnexion. 
 98  Koskenniemi and Leino ,  supra note 76 , at  578. 
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the numerous exceptions that the  ‘ EU-Member States ’ group has been granted since 
the ﬁ rst success in the GATT, one can ask whether this record will bring about the 
emergence of a new international customary rule favouring European integration. 
The developments within the GATT and the WTO support this movement, and so does 
the ECtHR’s position in  Bosphorus . The current practice of enacting supranational leg-
islation implementing the Security Council’s resolutions suggests that some sort of 
supranational exception will also apply in this context. 
 The process of European integration is an open-ended endeavour. The administra-
tion of normative conﬂ icts will therefore remain a permanent challenge for all actors 
concerned. Given the evolution of European law, the topical uncertainties about the 
intra-EU division of international powers, and the proliferation of international norms, 
the risk of inconsistencies is likely to persist rather than disappear. 
 It is therefore possible to imagine that the use of international legal tools favouring 
the supranational enterprise will persist and even increase. Without any doubt, the 
alleged  sui generis nature of the Brussels-related international agenda has annoyed 
numerous diplomats and legal scholars. Without these tools, however, European 
integration could be seriously hampered, because its subject-matter coverage touches 
upon an increasing number of issues of international importance. No international 
court will probably ever say that there is a genuine customary supranational excep-
tion, because nothing guarantees that the EC will always respect its international 
duties. Nevertheless, there is a strong likelihood that the sophistication of the Euro-
pean legal order, combined with practical, legal, and political considerations, will lead 
different international actors to lean towards deference whenever the supranational 
element enters the theatre of international life. 
